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Abstract 
 
Global electronic commerce, driven by the development of the Internet, promises to be a key en-
gine of growth in this century.  One of the most contentious issues facing businesses today is the 
ownership and use of personal data.  Europe has taken the lead in this area with a comprehensive 
approach, the European Union Data Directive, that became effective in 1998.  This paper com-
pares the European Union approach to Internet privacy with that of the United States.  In compar-
ing the two, the paper includes a brief discussion of current legislation under both approaches 
and also discusses critical issues in the debate for Internet privacy, including state-directed legis-
lation vs. self-regulation, corporate privacy statements, and the opt-in versus opt-out approaches 
to consumer protection.  The paper offers perspectives on whether the United States will adopt 
new Internet privacy legislation, and on the feasibility and repercussions of maintaining the cur-
rent approach. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
lobal electronic commerce promises to be one of the key engines of global economic growth this century.  
Projected growth rates for business-to-consumer Internet sales between 2001 and 2002 range between 50 
and 100% (Jarvis, 2001).  Computer ownership and Internet access are both growing at an astounding pace 
globally.  For example, the number of Internet users in China increased from 1,750,000 in July 1998 to 
16,900,000 in July 2000, nearly 1000% growth in two years.  One of the key issues facing corporations today is the 
ownership and use of personal data collected on-line during Internet transactions. 
 
One of the major challenges is balancing the need for consumer privacy against the desire to ensure an en-
vironment conducive to continued development of e-commerce and the global economy.  The European Union has 
adopted comprehensive social legislation.  The United States, however, has relied on corporate self-regulation and a 
hands-off laissez faire approach.   In 1998 a debate raged in the United States regarding Internet consumer privacy, 
raising the possibility of a more comprehensive legislative approach.  Congress introduced over 80 bills, and Presi-
dent Clinton formed a team consisting of Commerce Secretary Daley and Ira Magaziner to warn corporate America 
to get its privacy house in order or face potentially expensive regulatory action (Joachim, 2001).  However, most of 
the bills languished in committee, and corporations procrastinated in making changes.  Accordingly, no comprehen-
sive regulation resulted.  After a relative lull, the debate is once again heating up with over three hundred privacy-
related bills currently in state legislatures and many others under consideration at the Federal level, including a 
comprehensive bill introduced in the House of Representatives (Despeignes, 2001; Cantos, Fine, Porcelli, & Selby, 
2001). 
__________ 
Readers with comments or questions are encouraged to contact the authors via email. 
 
 
An understanding of the Internet privacy debate and assistance in navigating the web of current and pro-
posed legislation in the United States and European Union should be of major interest to both academics and practi-
G 
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tioners.  First, if European firms set the standard for consumer privacy, then commercial sites not conforming to 
those standards will operate at a disadvantage marketing products and services over the web. Forester Research es-
timates that the cost of consumer concerns about Internet data privacy amounts to about $12.4 billion in lost sales 
annually (Despeignes, 2001). Second, the market for the trade of personal information between the United States 
and the European Union is estimated at $120 billion annually (Perine, 2000).  US corporations can ill afford to miss 
out on this potentially lucrative opportunity.  Third, it appears that once again, as with quality control standards and 
ISO 9000, the European Union with its European Union Data Directive has preempted the United States, which now 
must play catch-up in terms of putting into place the legislative infrastructure to deal with data privacy on the Inter-
net. 
 
The Debate 
 
 Prior to the late 1990s consumers in the United States appeared to be generally unconcerned with the issue 
of online privacy, opting instead to let the free hand of the market guide corporate decisions (Raysman & Brown, 
2000).  By 1998, however, debate over online privacy intensified because of increased online purchases, Internet 
fraud, and the enactment of the European Union Data Directive (EUDD) (Grande, 2000). The EUDD’s strict protec-
tion of consumer privacy set off warning bells in the United States and a flurry of negotiations between the United 
States and the European Union. The firewall that the EUDD created directly affected US corporations that faced the 
possibility of being locked out of certain types of Internet transactions with the European Union.  EUDD regulations 
require that EU member nations enact tough laws to ensure the integrity of personal data.  The EUDD forbids the 
transmission of personal data to non-member countries that have not put in place "adequate" safeguards to protect 
personal data.  Unfortunately the term "adequate" is a fairly ambiguous term that has proven difficult to define in 
negotiations between the United States and Europe. 
 
 The EUDD endeavors to "harmonize national laws on processing personal data and protect the rights and 
freedoms of the persons concerned, in particular their right to privacy."  First, EU members can collect personal data 
only for specific and legitimate purposes.  Second, the consumer must be clearly informed as to the purpose for col-
lection, any third party recipient, whether it is voluntary or required, and the repercussions of refusal to consent to 
the collection of personal information.  Third, the consumer must consent to any collection or use which must be 
consistent with that consent.  Finally, the EUDD mandates the creation of a Working Party on the Protection of In-
dividuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data, comprised of national and EU-level representatives (Euro-
pean Directive, 1995). 
 
 Whereas protection of consumer rights has figured prominently in the EU approach, the US message has 
been that unfettered e-commerce will benefit everyone by facilitating economic growth. As US Trade Representa-
tive Susan G. Esserman stated, "what we're (the United States) seeking to do is prevent barriers (to e-commerce) 
from being established in the first place" (Burgess, 1999).  Unlike the Europeans where privacy has been seen as a 
fundamental right, in the United States personal data has been to this point viewed as an asset to be bought or sold 
on the market (Raysman & Brown, 2000).  As indicated in the next section, the United States has not passed any 
comprehensive legislation covering on-line privacy. The United States approach sharply contrasts with the European 
Union approach.  One can characterize the European Union approach as "consumer-oriented social legislation 
(COSL)" and the United States approach as "growth-oriented self-regulation" (GOSR).  Under the US approach, as 
long as consumers do not complain, and businesses give the impression of having the best interests of the consumer 
in mind, the tango between government and business continues with minimal regulatory interference.  Since the 
EUDD was enacted in 1998, the US government approach has consisted of two major elements, industry self-
regulation and endeavoring to minimize regulatory controls.  Commerce Department spokesperson Morrie Goodman 
voiced the support of the Clinton Administration for this approach when he stated, “We have a long history of vo-
luntary regulation” (Bray, 1999).  The new Republican administration is even more resolved to continue this ap-
proach. 
 Naturally, business also supports the idea that the answer lies in self-regulation.  Many firms have taken 
steps to demonstrate their commitment. Both Microsoft and IBM have hired privacy experts to design and manage 
their privacy functions (Despeignes, 2001).  Amex offers "anonymous, secure web-shopping and temporary credit 
card numbers." DoubleClick now refuses to transact business with customers who do not meet its privacy criteria.  
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The self-regulation schema currently includes four major components: voluntarily promulgated privacy statements, 
trust certifications, privacy protection technology, as well as efforts to empower the consumer regarding the use of 
personal information. 
 
 Probably the most crucial element to the self-regulation approach is the voluntary promulgation of privacy 
statements within the technology industry (Privacy, 2000).  Companies have voluntarily adopted privacy statements 
for three main reasons.  First, corporations are sensitive to the risk that inadequate self-regulation could lead to more 
costly government sponsored regulation.  Second, they have done so to quell users' fears that their sensitive personal 
information would be misused.  Third, a recent motivation has been that posting privacy statements clearly and 
prominently on the website is required if companies are to receive certain types of information from the EU (Priva-
cy, 2000). AOL's online privacy policy is a good example of the types of issues covered in privacy policies.  It is 
seven pages long and covers a number of "dos" and "don'ts" concerning online personal data security, which they re-
fer to as their "eight principles of Privacy".  The "eight principles" address the use of personal information, the pri-
vacy of consumer online communications, the ability to correct errant information, consumer choice regarding 
AOL's use of personal data, the safeguarding of data, as well as their intent to keep the consumer informed about 
changes in that policy (AOL Privacy Policy, 2001). 
 
 The authors raise a number of concerns about the effectiveness of current online privacy policies.  First, 
many privacy statements were either drafted by lawyers with an insufficient understanding of technology issues, or 
by marketing departments with the goal of selling online security to the customer.  Second, since many websites link 
to others, it can become difficult for the consumer to figure out whose privacy statement applies (Ceniceros, 2000).  
Third, studies have shown that most consumers never take the time to read the statements.  Fourth, once the privacy 
policy has been drafted, procedures normally are not in place to update the policy to be consistent with changes in 
the corporation's business model or technology.  This raises the risk that corporate behavior might evolve to become 
inconsistent with stated policies.  Fifth, many are very skeptical that corporations can be trusted to regulate them-
selves in a way that ensures consumer welfare (Privacy, 2000). 
 
Detractors also criticize the privacy policy approach from the perspective of risk to the corporation (Priva-
cy, 2000).  Privacy policies can create a huge prospective liability for corporations.  Clearly delineated privacy poli-
cies published on the web are a promise the company must keep or face potential legal repercussions (Grossman, T. 
& Grossman, 2000; Ceniceros, 2000).  A number of recent high profile cases highlight the legal issues raised by 
published privacy policies, which may never have been raised if those policies had been kept internal to the firm.  
The most notorious case involves now defunct online toy e-tailer Toysmart.  In its online privacy policy the compa-
ny promised never to share its online customer database.  However, during bankruptcy Toysmart announced its in-
tentions to sell that database to the highest bidder (Geocities, 1999).  Although a bankruptcy judge rejected a settle-
ment between the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Toysmart that would have placed restrictions on that sale, 
the FTC plans to enter into the fray once again after a buyer has been found.  A second landmark case involved 
DoubleClick, which has been the target of a class action suit.  Consumers allege that the company surreptitiously 
collected private data from unsuspecting Web users.  In addition, the online privacy policy stated that the firm would 
not collect data in a way that allowed for personal identification of data.  However, after acquiring Abacus Direct, 
the firm changed its privacy policy to allow information that it collects to be associated with personally identifiable 
data.  Similarly, Amazon.com/Alexa Internet (a subsidiary of Amazon.com) was sued because its privacy statement 
implied that data would be used in the aggregate, rather than as personally identifiable data.  RealNetworks is being 
sued both for failing to follow its privacy statement as well as for the method in which it collected consumer infor-
mation.  Plaintiffs claim that the company, via a cookie placed on users' system at registration, covertly tracked mu-
sic and listening preferences as well as other personal information located on the consumers' hard drives.  Then the 
company allegedly sold the data to a third party.  Two other high profile cases involving breaches of online privacy 
and violations of stated privacy policies include Intuit and Geocities.  The Intuit case is of particular note due to the 
sensitivity of the personal data involved.  Plaintiffs allege that Intuit, via its Quicken.com website, collected personal 
financial data and shared this data with third parties in violation of its own stated privacy policy. 
 
 In a number of these high profile cases the FTC and the federal courts appear to be favoring leniency for 
corporations.  For example, GeoCities and the FTC settled their case out of court.  The settlement requires that 
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GeoCities post a clear and prominent policy statement on the web, allowing users' access to remove personal infor-
mation.  Also, GeoCities must now obtain "verifiable" consent from parents prior to collecting personal information 
from children (Geocities, 1999).  Also, early in the year, a federal judge dismissed all private lawsuits against Doub-
leClick.  The FTC did the same, with the agreement that DoubleClick carefully revise its data privacy policies.  
Amazon has also managed to settle its privacy lawsuits out of court.  In September of 2000, Amazon revised its pri-
vacy policies to fend off potential litigation.  The Wall Street Journal announced in May that the FTC had agreed not 
to review modifications to Amazon's privacy policy in 2000 as it could not identify any wrongdoing.  In what ap-
pears to be something of a publicity stunt, Amazon announced that it would pay $40 to any customer who could 
prove that the company had improperly gathered personal information, thereby placing the burden of proof onto the 
consumer (Prior, 2001).  On the other hand, because of the risk of costly potential litigation, every firm that does a 
significant amount of business over the Internet should take steps to seriously address the privacy issue.  A first log-
ical step would be to set up a separate privacy function staffed with personnel with training on the issue, working in 
tandem with corporate legal counsel (Grossman, T. & Grossman, 2000).  The privacy staff should be charged with 
constantly monitoring the consistency of privacy policies with corporate behavior and managing the evolution of 
those policies with changes in technology and the firm’s business model. 
 
Other than voluntary privacy statements, firms have proposed to self-regulate in a number of other ways.   
One mechanism is to seek a sort of “Good Housekeeping” seal of approval from an independent, non-profit entity, 
which audits the firm’s compliance with its own privacy policies.  TRUSTe is probably the most familiar of these 
entities.  If a firm satisfies the entity’s criteria by meeting certain minimum standards, then the TRUSTe certification 
is posted prominently on the website (Privacy, 2000).  The Better Business Bureau has launched its own program, 
and TrustUK, an entity sponsored by the British government and offering similar e-trade trust services, began in July 
of 2000.  Clicksure and Trust-On-Line, to name a few, offer similar services.  Whether these entities can be held lia-
ble for not identifying inconsistencies between a firm’s stated policies and behavior has not yet been litigated. 
 
Another self-regulatory mechanism promoted by the industry is “P3P”, Platform for Privacy Preferences, 
developed by the World Wide Web Consortium, a not-for-profit entity promoting common standards for the Inter-
net.  What P3P promises to do is to allow users to pre-screen web sites to determine whether or not it satisfies the 
consumer’s privacy criteria.  The latest version of Microsoft’s Internet Explorer will contain P3P technology as part 
of the program.  Critics claim that P3P has its own inherent problems.  First of all, it does not guarantee that compa-
nies will not change their policies after they collect the personal data.  A prominent example is Toysmart which, 
contrary to its privacy policy, decided to sell personal information to the highest bidder during bankruptcy.  Second, 
P3P technology cannot guard against the possibility that as consumers’ preferences change, some customers may 
begin to feel uncomfortable about data they previously consented to being collected. 
 
Besides the P3P technology, companies can empower consumers regarding usage of their personal data by 
allowing them to either “opt-in” or “opt-out” of the collection of personal data.  Opt-in is by far the stricter solution. 
Companies that grant consumers the right to opt-in cannot use any personal information at all unless the consumer 
consents to that use.  Therefore, with opt-in the data inventory is left empty unless the consumer agrees to items be-
ing entered into that inventory.  Opt-out on the other hand allows e-businesses to gather and use any personal infor-
mation that the consumer does not clearly object to being used. Therefore, in opt-out the data inventory will be filled 
unless the consumer objects, addressing each type of data specifically to be withheld.  Senator Hollings introduced 
an opt-in bill in Congress in 2000, but the bill died in committee with little hope of reintroduction in the near future. 
Consumers favor the opt-in approach.  Recent research by Harris Interactive Inc. indicates that 84% of adults would 
not permit a website to share personal information with a third party.  In addition, 86% would want websites to re-
quest permission (opt-in) before using any personal information for marketing purposes, including names, addresses 
and telephone numbers (Jarvis, 2001). Of course marketers support the opt-out approach.  The Clinton administra-
tion and the FTC both supported the opt-out approach to personal data privacy (Consumers’ Views, 2000).  Most 
bills currently in Congress also favor this approach.  Considering the current pro-business Republican administration 
under Bush, chances are that any bill that becomes law will favor the opt-out approach. 
 
 In addition to self-regulation, the United States approach has favored efforts to keep regulatory control of 
the Internet to a minimum.  As regards the EUDD, since 1998 agencies of the United States Government have been 
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negotiating feverishly to try to satisfy EU demands for “adequate protection” (European Directive, 1995).  During 
these negotiations, the United States side has continually countered the stiff pro-consumer demands inherent to the 
EUDD with proposals for self-regulation.  For example, a joint EU/US statement on electronic commerce in 1997 
stated that “unnecessary existing legal and regulatory barriers should be eliminated and the emergence of new ones 
should be prevented” (Joint Statement, 1997).  And as is stated in a December 18, 2000 Statement of the United 
States and the European Union on Building Consumer Confidence in E-Commerce and the Role of Alternative Dis-
pute Resolution “the means of building consumer confidence and consumer protection in shopping on-line is good 
business practice and enforceable self-regulatory programs such as codes of conduct and trustmarks” (Statement on 
Confidence, 2000).  More recently, the Bush administration has been resisting EU demands that the US banking in-
dustry adhere to the EU’s consumer privacy laws. 
 
 Consistent with the US desire to minimize regulatory controls, the United States and the European Union 
have negotiated a compromise to satisfy demands for “adequate protection” of transferred information. This volunta-
ry “Safe Harbor” scheme became active in April 1999.  Entering into a Safe Harbor enables an organization to “re-
ceive, transmit, process and use personal data” from the European Union, within the bounds of Safe Harbor prin-
ciples (European Directive, 1995). The FTC is the primary enforcement agency for the Safe Harbor arrangement. An 
organization may participate in a Safe Harbor in three ways.  First, it can become a member of a privacy organiza-
tion that adheres to those principles.  A second method is via self-certification.  Third, it may be an organization al-
ready subject to governmental regulation regarding data privacy (Commission Decision 95/46/EC, Annex I, 2000).  
Safe Harbor principles address a number of important issues.  The first issue is “notice”.  The consumer must be 
clearly and conspicuously notified why the data is being collected, the intended use, third party use, and options for 
the consumer to deny disclosure.  Usually this requires that the privacy policy be posted conspicuously on the web-
site.  The principles also facilitate consumer choice by allowing them opt-in for sensitive personal information and 
opt-out for third party transfer of personal data or use other than originally intended. The organization must provide 
“reasonable” security against misuse, theft, abuse, loss, disclosure, alteration and destruction of personal data.  The 
organization must also take “reasonable” steps to insure the integrity of the data in terms of its accuracy, timeliness, 
and completeness.  Finally, consumers must have a “reasonable” right to access data collected and to correct, amend 
or delete inaccuracies (Decision 95/46/EC, Annex II, 2000). 
 
Current State of Federal Legislation Concerning Online Privacy 
 
Currently US Internet privacy is covered by a patchwork of federal and state privacy laws, most of which 
were not crafted to directly deal with the issue, but many of which have taken a prominent place in current litigation.   
One example is the Electronic Commerce Privacy Act (ECPA), which is a 1986 revision of the federal wiretap sta-
tute.  The law prohibits both the unauthorized accessing of computer facilities or networks and prohibits exceeding 
authorization limitations on access.  It also prohibits the unauthorized interception of data.  The law, which provides 
for both civil and criminal penalties, has found its way into most Internet privacy litigation.   Another law, the Com-
puter Abuse and Fraud Act, also known as the anti-hacking statute, also prohibits unauthorized access to computer 
facilities or exceeding authorization limitations on access to those facilities.  Computers protected under the statute 
include the broad rubric of those used in interstate commerce or communications.   In addition it prohibits the 
transmitting of a computer virus to a protected computer with malicious intent.  Although to invoke this statute dam-
ages must total a minimum of $5000 in one year, these may be aggregated.  Hence, the statute features prominently 
in class action privacy litigation. 
 
The Children's Online Privacy Act of 1998 (COPPA) is unique in that it is one of the few privacy laws 
written specifically to address the issue of Internet privacy.  The law restricts the collection of private information 
regarding children under the age of 13 during web surfing activities.  This information includes, names, physical and 
virtual addresses, telephone numbers and social security numbers.  Web operators are also prohibited from collect-
ing other personally identifiable data about the child or child's parents.  Prior to collecting any of the above data, the 
web operator must obtain "verifiable consent".  Under COPPA, no website can condition the participation in web ac-
tivities (such as games) on the disclosure of personal information by the child. 
 
Two other statutes of note include the Video Privacy Act (enacted in 1988) and the Cable TV Privacy Act 
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of 1984.  Although the Video Privacy Act was created to protect the privacy of consumers with regard to their video 
rentals and purchases, it potentially may be applicable to the sale of downloaded or streaming video on demand over 
the Internet.  This carries potential liability for e-tailers like Amazon.com, which engage in the "rental, sale, or deli-
very of prerecorded video cassette tape or similar audio visual materials” (Video Privacy Act, 1988).  The Cable TV 
Privacy Act of 1984 has recently become potentially relevant to Internet privacy because of the ability of cable op-
erators to offer Internet access.  The act states that the "cable operator can not collect personally identifiable infor-
mation without the prior written or electronic consent of the subscriber concerned” (Cable TV Privacy Act, 1984).  
The act provides a fairly clear and quite strict "opt-in" approach to data collection.  It still remains to be seen how 
this will affect cable operators supplying Internet access, and whether or not they will be precluded from collecting 
"click stream" data. 
 
 Over the last year, momentum toward a legislative solution to the Internet privacy debate has been grow-
ing.  As referred to earlier in this paper, a Harris study indicates that consumers appear to prefer more stringent con-
trols over the ability of e-firms to collect and use their personal data.  The results of a recent Pew Internet & Ameri-
can Life Project are striking in that they indicate that consumers are willing to grant the government surprisingly 
broad powers to monitor the Internet in its efforts to reduce cybercrime.  This includes even some monitoring capa-
bility over personal email messages (Joachim, 2001).  In addition, 54% indicate that web tracking invades privacy.  
Finally, a surprising 94% agree that firms should be disciplined if they violate their own privacy policy (Consumers' 
Views, 2000).  Congress is planning to start debate over a number of significant pieces of web privacy legislative 
proposals that, if they become law, could have an incredible impact on the cost of doing business over the Internet 
(Teinowitz, 2001; Sinrod, 2001).  Proposals include a prohibition against unauthorized "cookies", extending the ju-
risdiction of the COPPA (for children) to adults, and broadening the regulatory powers of the FTC (The Consumer 
Online Privacy and Disclosure Act) (Private Eyes, 2001; Despeignes, 2001). 
 
 This paper cannot discuss the large number of Internet privacy bills introduced into Congress, but it sum-
marizes below those that are potentially most important.  In 2000 the Student Privacy Protection Act stalled in 
committee, but there is still a good chance that it, or something similar to it, will be reintroduced soon.  If it becomes 
law, the Student Privacy Protection Act would prevent federal funded educational institutions from selling student 
personal data without express parental consent (Private Eyes, 2001).  At least two other proposals would directly af-
fect "spyware" programs that have the ability to access personal information on the hard drives of consumers with-
out their consent.  The Social Security Online Privacy Protection Act would regulate the use of social security num-
bers and related personally identifiable information by interactive computer services.  A number of other bills would 
either regulate or prohibit Spam, or the transmission of unsolicited email advertisements. Finally, the Consumer On-
line Privacy Act is also currently before Congress.  This bill would prohibit the linking of Internet Provider web ad-
dresses with personal information, and the tracking of web-surfers' Internet activities. 
 
 Probably the most significant piece of legislation is the Consumer Internet Privacy Enhancement Act (CI-
PEA) introduced in Congress this year by Representatives Anna Eshoo and Chris Cannon.  The bill is of the "opt-
out" type, and endeavors to "empower the consumers" to protect their privacy on the Internet.  The Act is a compre-
hensive approach that contains a number of provisions of critical importance to e-tailers, many of which are similar 
to those of the EUDD.  Under CIPEA, a clear and conspicuous policy must be posted on the web outlining the fol-
lowing: the identity of the web operator, any third parties who have access to or may purchase the data, the types of 
data collected, a description of data security measures in place, and a name, physical and email address, and tele-
phone number for the Web operator (Cantos, Fine, Porcelli, & Selby, 2001).  Basically CIPEA would prohibit the 
collection of personally identifiable data unless the Web operator informs the consumer, and allows the consumer to 
limit the disclosure and use of the information gathered (Young, 2001). 
 
Conclusions 
 
The European Union has taken the initiative on Internet privacy legislation with the comprehensive ap-
proach of the EUDD.  Similar to the “consumer-oriented social legislation” (COSR) approach of the European Un-
ion, in April of 2000, Canada passed the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, which be-
came effective January 1, 2001.  It requires that firms that collect data online inform customers about what they are 
International Business & Economics Research Journal                                                  Volume 1, Number 2 
 7 
gathering, why they are gathering it, and how it will be used.  The Law will take full effect by 2004 (Internet Priva-
cy, 2001; Perine, 2000).  Currently, Internet privacy in the United States is governed by a patchwork of state and 
federal laws.  No overarching comprehensive legislation has been passed.  The United States is playing catch-up, 
with a plethora of Internet privacy related bills facing Congress.   One of the most significant bills at this point is the 
Consumer Internet Privacy Enhancement Act that offers a somewhat more comprehensive “opt-out” approach to 
protecting the privacy of individuals online.  The Internet privacy debate has been heating up as of late.  Continuing 
breaches of personal privacy and highly publicized cases of misuse of that information by firms which violate their 
own privacy policies has sparked consumer ire.  Congress appears ready for fairly significant change in the legisla-
tive approach.  On the other hand, the Bush administration seems to be pulling back, favoring a continuation of the 
“growth-oriented self-regulation” (GOSR) approach.  Clearly, the stage is set for change.  However, the question is, 
how effective will the adherents to GOSR within the current administration be in forestalling any comprehensive 
legislative agenda?  What will emerge from the conflict between the historical preference of the United States politi-
cal-economic culture for a GOSR-type approach that favors corporate self-regulation versus an increasingly influen-
tial European Union COSR-type approach that favors consumers over big business and state directed comprehensive 
regulation?   
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